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 WHY DO RETAIL INVESTORS MAKE COSTLY 
MISTAKES? AN EXPERIMENT ON MUTUAL FUND 
CHOICE 
Jill E. Fisch
* 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
** 
Abstract 
There is mounting evidence that retail investors make 
predictable, costly investment mistakes, including underinvestment, 
naïve diversification, and payment of excessive fund fees. Over the past 
thirty-five years, however, participant-directed 401(k) plans have largely 
replaced professionally managed pension plans, requiring 
unsophisticated retail investors to navigate the financial markets 
themselves. Policy-makers have struggled with regulatory interventions 
designed to improve the quality of investment decisions without a clear 
understanding of the reasons for investor mistakes.  Absent such an 
understanding, it is difficult to design effective regulatory responses. 
This article offers a first step in understanding the investor 
decision-making process.  We use an internet-based experiment to 
disentangle possible explanations for inefficient investment decisions.   
The experiment employs a simplified construct of an employee’s 
allocation among the options in a retirement plan coupled with 
technology that enables us to collect data on the specific information that 
investors choose to view.  In addition to collecting general information 
about the process by which investors choose among mutual fund options, 
we employ an experimental manipulation to test the effect of an 
instruction on the importance of mutual fund fees.  Pairing this 
instruction with simplified fee disclosure allows us to distinguish 
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between motivation-limits and cognition-limits as explanations for the 
widespread findings that investors ignore fees in their investment 
decisions.   
Our results offer partial but limited grounds for optimism.  On the 
one hand, within our simplified experimental construct, our subjects 
allocated more money, on average, to higher-value funds.  Furthermore, 
subjects who received the fees instruction paid closer attention to mutual 
fund fees and allocated their investments into funds with lower fees.  On 
the other hand, the effects of even a blunt fees instruction were limited, 
and investors were unable to identify and avoid clearly inferior fund 
options.  In addition, our results suggest that excessive, naïve 
diversification strategies are driving many investment decisions.  
Although our findings are preliminary, they suggest valuable avenues for 
future research and important implications for regulation of retail 
investing.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
    There is mounting evidence that retail investors make 
predictable, costly mistakes.
1  They save too little; they trade too 
frequently; they buy high and sell low; they invest in fad instruments 
they do not understand; and they pay excessive fees. In an August 2012, 
200-page study prepared in response to a Dodd-Frank mandate, the SEC 
concluded that “American investors lack basic financial literacy.”
2 The 
study found that investors do not understand basic concepts such as 
diversification, investment costs, inflation and compound interest, and 
that they lack the knowledge necessary to protect themselves from fraud.   
  Despite investors’ seemingly limited competence, regulatory and 
market developments increasingly require retail investors to navigate the 
financial markets themselves. Over the past thirty-five years, participant-
directed 401(k) plans have largely replaced professionally managed 
pension plans.
3 Unlike traditional pension plans, participant-directed 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Andrea Frazzini & Owen Lamont, Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and 
the Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 88 J.  FIN.  ECON. 299 (2008) (concluding that 
“individual investors have a striking ability to do the wrong thing.”).   
2 S ECURITIES  &  EXCHANGE  COMM’N,  SEC  STAFF  STUDY  REGARDING  FINANCIAL 
LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS, 15 (2012) (hereinafter “SEC STAFF STUDY”). 
3  See  Pamela Perun & Joseph John Valenti, Defined Benefit Plans: Going, Going, 
Gone? 4 (2008), available at planetnow.com/metaPage/lib/Perun-
ValentiFinalAppam.pdf (observing that “[i]n 1975, over 70% of active employees  
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401(k) plans place the responsibility for critical investment decisions in 
the hands of employees, who are responsible for selecting their own 
investments from a menu of employer-provided alternatives. This means 
that low-level employees—individuals with even less investment 
knowledge than the general population
4—are now investing for 
retirement with almost no guidance. 
To complicate matters further, mutual funds are the dominant 
investment option provided by employer-sponsored 401(k) plans, and the 
primary way in which retail investors participate in the stock market both 
in- and outside of retirement plans.
5 Unlike other equity investments, 
notably stock, mutual funds are held primarily by individual investors.
6 
This market segmentation means that retail fund investors cannot benefit 
from market discipline effected by more sophisticated institutions.
7   
As a result, there are reasons to doubt the efficiency of the mutual 
fund market: specifically, whether the market offers retail investors 
reasonable and comprehensible investment options. In particular, many 
commentators are puzzled by the huge number of fund choices and by 
the persistence of high-fee funds that underperform the market.
8   
  Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
Department of Labor and the courts have struggled with the possibility 
that market forces are insufficient to protect retail investors from making 
poor investment decisions.  Regulatory responses designed to protect 
                                                                                                                       
participated in a defined benefit plan.  In 2005, the majority of active employees (over 
75%) participated in a defined contribution plan instead.”). 
4 SEC STAFF STUDY, supra note 2, at 15. 
5  See I NVESTMENT  COMPANY  INSTITUTE,  2012  INVESTMENT  COMPANY  FACT  BOOK 
(2012), at 90, (hereinafter “ICI FACT BOOK”) (stating that 91% of mutual fund holding 
households hold mutual fund shares inside retirement plans). 
6 See id. at 86 (explaining that households owned 89% of mutual fund assets as of the 
end of 2011). Institutional use of mutual funds is limited and consists mostly of money 
market funds, which are used for cash management.  See Id. 
7 Some mutual funds operate multiple versions that are sold to retail and institutional 
investors. Although institutional “twins” typically charge lower fees than retail funds, 
one study finds that retail funds with an institutional twin perform better, suggesting 
that, in this context, retail investors can benefit from the market discipline imposed by 
institutions. See Richard B. Evans & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Institutional Investors and 
Mutual Fund Governance: Evidence from Retail–Institutional Fund Twins, 25 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 3530 (2012). 
8 See, e.g., Peter J. Walliston & Robert E. Litan, COMPETITIVE EQUITY (2007), 8-9 
(observing that the mutual fund industry does not appear to conform to the “law of one 
price”).  
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investors include mandated disclosure requirements, product limits, and 
the imposition of fiduciary duties on employers, brokers and investment 
advisors. Widespread litigation over the role of judicial oversight of 
mutual fund fees and the scope of employer obligations in designing a 
retirement plan raises questions about the manner in which individuals 
make investment decisions.  In one such high profile case, Seventh 
Circuit Judges Posner and Easterbrook, although reaching opposite 
conclusions about investor behavior, noted that the manner in which 
such decisions are made is critical to evaluating the appropriate level of 
regulatory intervention.
9 
  The importance of understanding investor behavior is not limited 
to the litigation context.  With the increasing dependence of employees 
on their 401(k) plans to deliver retirement income, employers are 
rethinking issues such as plan structure and the choice of investment 
options.
10  BrightScope’s highly-publicized on-line ratings and rankings 
of 401(k) plans have heightened employer attention to the importance of 
plan design.
11   
  Congress acknowledged the need for a better understanding of 
investor behavior in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).
12  Specifically, in Dodd-Frank, Congress 
                                                 
9 Compare Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that 
market discipline should constrain excessive mutual fund fees by driving investors 
away from costly funds); Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), denying reh’g to 527 F.3d 627 
(7th Cir. 2008) (questioning whether high fees actually drive investors away).  The 
United States Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit decision without resolving 
the question.  See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1430-1431 (2010) 
(“The debate between the Seventh Circuit panel and the dissent from the denial of 
rehearing regarding today's mutual fund market is a matter for Congress, not the 
courts.”). 
10 See, e.g., AON HEWITT, 2011 TRENDS & EXPERIENCE IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PLANS,  ASSOCIATES, TRENDS AND EXPERIENCE IN 401(K) PLANS (2009), (explaining 
emerging trends in plan design and administration). 
11 See, e.g., YOUR 401(K) PLAN’S ONLINE REPORT CARD — AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT 
IT, E IS FOR ERISA, Oct. 5, 2011, http://eforerisa.wordpress.com/2011/10/05/your-
401k-plans-online-report-card-and-what-to-do-about-it/ (providing advice to employers 
on addressing a low BrightScope rating); Ron Lieber, Spotlighting 401(k) Plans, 
Thanklessly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, (describing attention received by BrightScope 
ratings and criticisms of its methodology). 
12 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010) 
(hereinafter “Dodd-Frank Act”).  
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instructed the SEC to conduct a study of investor financial literacy.
13 The 
SEC’s study was conducted at the most superficial level, however, and 
produced limited insight into developing future regulatory policy.
14 
Although the SEC identified investor mistakes and misconceptions, it did 
not seek to identify the reasons for these mistakes or to understand the 
underlying mechanisms driving investor choices.  
This article takes up where the SEC study left off.  We report the 
results of an experiment designed to explore how investors use the 
information provided to them, and why they often ignore it. Using a 
simulated investment game in which participants were asked to allocate 
funds in a retirement account among ten mutual fund alternatives, we 
offer some insights into how individuals seek and assimilate information 
about a fund’s characteristics. In particular, our experiment offers a 
novel addition to the body of experimental evidence on investor 
decision-making by incorporating a technology that allows us to collect 
data on the specific information that investors choose to view.   
In addition to collecting general information about the process by 
which investors choose among mutual fund options, we employ an 
experimental manipulation to test the effect of an instruction on the 
importance of mutual fund fees.  Pairing this instruction with simplified 
fee disclosure allows us to distinguish between motivation-limits and 
cognition-limits as explanations for the widespread findings that 
investors ignore fees in their investment decisions.   
Our results offer partial but limited grounds for optimism.  On the 
one hand, within our simplified experimental construct, our subjects 
allocated more money, on average, to higher-value funds.  Furthermore, 
subjects who received the fees instruction paid closer attention to mutual 
fund fees and allocated their investments into funds with lower fees.  On 
the other hand, the effects of even a blunt fee instruction were limited, 
and investors were unable to identify and avoid clearly inferior fund 
options.  In addition, our results suggest excessive, naïve diversification 
strategies are driving many investment decisions.    
 
Our findings are concededly preliminary. More importantly, 
because of the simplified nature of our experiment, extension of our 
results to real world investment decisions, in which the stakes and the 
                                                 
13 Id. at § 917.   
14 SEC STAFF STUDY, supra note 2.  
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cost of gathering and evaluating investment information are much 
higher, is unclear.  Nonetheless, our research offers a starting point in 
terms of both understanding investor behavior and evaluating efforts to 
improve the quality of investor decisions.  In particular, determining 
whether effective investor education is possible is critical to evaluating 
the manner in which we regulate, structure, and evaluate retail investing 
options such as retirement plans.   
 
The article is organized as follows. Part I briefly describes the 
regulatory environment for mutual funds and 401(k) retirement plans. 
Part II identifies key findings on retail investor decision-making and 
observes how these findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of market 
discipline in the mutual fund market. Part III describes our experiment 
structure. Part IV reports our results. Part V explores the implications of 
our findings and identifies next steps for additional research.   
I.  THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR MUTUAL FUNDS AND 
401(K) PLANS 
A.  Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds are the dominant investment vehicle for retail 
investors.
15 A mutual fund is a pool of assets that may include stocks, 
bonds, and other investment products. A mutual fund investor purchases 
shares that represent a pro rata ownership interest in the fund’s pool of 
assets. The fund is required to value its assets on a daily basis and to 
purchase and sell fund shares at their net asset value, or “NAV.”
16  
At the end of 2011, there were over 7,637 active mutual funds in 
the United States.
17 Mutual funds are typically categorized according to 
the type of assets in which they invest. These include funds that invest 
primarily in equity, funds that confine themselves to fixed income 
investments, and hybrid funds that combine the two. Funds may be 
                                                 
15 The economic importance of mutual funds worldwide is even greater. The Investment 
Company Institute reported that there were 72, 657 mutual funds worldwide, holding 
almost $24 trillion in assets at the end of 2011.  ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 193. 
16 For a general description of mutual funds, see Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation 
of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 1961 (2012). 
17 ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 134 table 1. In addition to funds, there were over 
1100 exchange traded funds or ETFs as of the end of 2011.  Id. at 147 Table 14.  ETFs 
differ from mutual funds in several key features, including the manner in which they 
trade, but offer investors a similar type of diversified investment.  See Fisch, supra note 
16 (describing ETFs).  
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actively managed or seek to replicate the performance of an index such 
as the S&P 500. Some funds focus on a particular segment of the market 
such as energy stocks or pharmaceuticals, others in specific asset classes 
such as large cap equities or junk bonds. International funds purchase 
assets from across the globe or within a specific foreign country or 
geographic region. Target date funds offer a shifting mix of equities and 
fixed income assets that becomes more conservative as the specified 
target date approaches.
18   
Mutual funds do not typically hire employees to make investment 
decisions or perform administrative services.
19 Instead, funds outsource 
all operational requirements to outside service providers. The funds pass 
on the costs of these services to the funds’ shareholders in the form of 
various fees. Funds’ fees can include sales fees (also known as “loads”), 
management fees, distribution (12b-1) fees, and administrative 
expenses.
20 Of these fees, the largest are management fees, which are 
paid to the funds’ investment advisors. In addition to these fees, a fund 
may have less transparent expenses, such as trading commissions.  The 
cost of commissions is not included in the funds’ tables of fees, but is 
also borne by the funds’ shareholders.
21  The complexity of fund fee 
structures makes it difficult to calculate costs or compare different 
funds.
22  
As of 2011, forty-four percent of U.S. households, or 52.3 
million households, owned mutual funds.
23  Mutual fund investing is not 
limited to wealthy or sophisticated retail investors; most mutual fund-
                                                 
18 Target date funds are often used for retirement investing.  See Fisch, supra note 16 at 
2022-23 (explaining target date funds). 
19 See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and 
Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (2006) (explaining 
that “the typical mutual fund is a rudimentary legal vessel [which] has no offices, no 
equipment and no employees.”). 
20 See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N, MUTUAL FUND FEES AND EXPENSES (2007) 
(describing various types of mutual fund fees and expenses). 
21 See Fisch, supra note 16 at 1996-98 (explaining economic importance of trading 
commissions). 
22 As one commentator observes, the complexity of fee structures may allow mutual 
funds to resist competitive pressure by preventing retail investors from understanding 
fund pricing.  Bruce I. Carlin, Strategic Price Complexity in Retail Financial Markets, 
91 J. FIN. ECON. 278 (2009). 
23 Id. at 86. Mutual fund ownership has increased dramatically over the past thirty 
years.  In 1980, less than six percent of US households owned mutual funds. Id. at 85.  
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owning households had household incomes of less than $100,000.
24 The 
relative lack of sophistication among mutual fund investors has led 
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate 
mutual funds strictly.   
The SEC oversees the operation of mutual funds, which are 
heavily regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940, or the 
“ICA.”
25 Among the regulations imposed on mutual funds are extensive 
disclosure regulations, including disclosure of a fund’s investment 
objectives, costs, investment strategies, and advisers. Funds are restricted 
in their investments, in their use of leverage, and in the manner in which 
they compensate their investment advisers.
26 The ICA also requires 
mutual funds to have a board consisting of directors of whom at least 
40% must be independent of the fund’s investment advisor.
27 Finally, the 
ICA requires the funds’ shareholders to elect the directors and to approve 
certain structural changes.
28 
The extensive regulation of mutual funds is a direct response to 
concerns about investor exploitation and the inability of market forces to 
adequately protect investors. Investors in mutual funds lost 40% of their 
investments between 1929 and 1936.
29 Congress found, relying on an 
SEC study, that mutual fund sponsors were acting largely out of self-
interest, abandoning their fiduciary duties to investors and charging 
investors with unjustified costs and expenses.
30 The ICA was Congress’ 
response to that problem. 
However, the problem of mutual funds charging excessive fees 
continued. In 1966, the SEC reported to Congress that neither the ICA 
nor market discipline provided mutual fund investors with sufficient 
                                                 
24 Id. at 88. Only 38% of mutual fund owning households had incomes over $100,000, 
and the median income for mutual fund holding households was $80,000. Id. 
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006). 
26 Fisch, supra note 16 at 1170-71. 
27 SEC rules set a higher threshold, requiring fund boards to have a majority of 
independent directors in order for the fund to qualify for certain exemptive rules. See 
Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release 
No. 7932, Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734, 3736 ( Jan. 16, 2001) (codified as amended at scattered 
parts of 17 C.F.R.). 
28 Unlike operating companies, mutual funds need not provide annual meetings for the 
election of directors. 
29 Paul Roye, Speech by SEC Staff: A Celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the 
Investment Company Act (Oct. 4, 2000). 
30 Id.  
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protection against excessive costs.
31 The SEC noted that the problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that mutual funds were sold primarily to “family 
[men] of moderate income.”
32 In response, the SEC recommended that 
the ICA be amended to limit investment advisors to a “reasonable” fee 
for their management services and “that this standard be enforceable in 
the courts.”
33   
Congress adopted the SEC’s recommendation and included in the 
1970 revisions to the ICA Section 36(b), which imposes a fiduciary duty 
upon investment advisers with respect to compensation received from a 
mutual fund and provides investors with a private right of action to 
enforce this duty.
34 Today, fees are far lower than they were in the 
1960s, and, according to the Investment Company Institute, most new 
investments are made in funds that charge lower fees.
35 Nonetheless, 
mutual fund fees continue to vary significantly. Morningstar reports that 
currently the average reported expense ratio for U.S. large cap equity 
mutual funds is 1.31%,
36 but fees range from .05%
37 to more than 2%.
38      
                                                 
31 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
OF  INVESTMENT  COMPANY  GROWTH TO HOUSE  COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND 
FOREIGN COMMERCE (1966) (hereinafter 1966 SEC REPORT). The report concludes that 
“mutual fund shareholders need protection against incurring excessive costs in the 
acquisition and management of thew [sic] investments and that, given the structure and 
incentives prevailing in the industry, neither competition nor the few elementary 
safeguards against conflict of interest deemed sufficient in 1940 and contained in the 
Investment Company Act presently provide this protection in adequate measure.”  Id. at 
viii. 
32 1966 SEC Report, supra note, at ix. 
33 Id. at viii. 
34 15 U.S.C. 80a-36(b), Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 
1423 (2010). 
35 ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5 at 71-72. 
36 FINRA, Fund Analyzer Additional Information, available at 
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/P117437 (last visited Sept. 19. 2012). 
37 Fidelity’s Spartan S&P 500 index fund currently has an expense ratio of .05% for 
investors investing over $10,000.  See Fidelity.com, Spartan 500 Index Fund - Investor 
Class, Expense ratio, available at http://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-
funds/summary/315911206 (last visited February 15, 2013). 
38 Alliance Bernstein’s Blended Style Funds Tax-Managed International Portfolio, for 
example, has an expense ratio of 2.02%. See Alliance Bernstein Website, 
AllianceBernstein Blended Style Funds Tax-Managed International Portfolio, 
Performance, 
https://www.alliancebernstein.com/abcom/Product_Center/3_Vehicle/MF/Equity/Core/
Tax-Mgd_International_Portfolio.htm?shareclass=A (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).  
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Although one might imagine that competitive markets would 
make it difficult for investors to raise legal challenges to fees they 
voluntarily elected to pay, suits against mutual fund advisers alleging 
excessive fees are surprisingly common.
39 To date, no court has ever 
held an advisor liable in so-called “§36(b)” litigation,
40 but one 
commentator estimates that the defense and settlement of these lawsuits 
costs the mutual fund industry $400 million per year.
41  To a certain 
extent, this litigation pits the legal standard of fiduciary obligation 
against the effectiveness of market discipline.  
  This tension was recently exposed in the Seventh Circuit 
opinions in Jones v. Harris.
42  The panel majority in Jones viewed 
extensive judicial oversight over fee levels as inappropriate, reasoning 
that “investors can and do protect their interests by shopping, and that 
regulating advisory fees through litigation is unlikely to do more good 
than harm.”
43  Critical to the court’s analysis was an assessment of the 
role of investor decisions in constraining fees. As Judge Posner observed 
in his dissent from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, the 
court’s reasoning raised an important empirical question: “will high fees 
drive investors away?”
44  
The Supreme Court in Jones
45 did not resolve what one 
commentator terms “the sharp disagreement between two leading 
market-oriented jurists” about the operation of the market for mutual 
funds.
46  Empirical studies have begun to try to answer this question, and 
the study we report in Part III adds to that growing literature.
47   
                                                 
39 Todd Henderson finds that more than 100 lawsuits have been filed since 1970 when 
the Investment Company Act was amended to provide a private right of action under 
§36(b).  Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U.  CHI.  L.  REV. 1027 1033 (2010); 
Quinn Curtis and John Morley report that investors filed 91 suits against mutual fund 
advisors alleging excessive fees between 2000 and 2009. Quinn Curtis & John D. 
Morley, An Empirical Study of Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Litigation: Do the Merits 
Matter? J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming, 2013). 
40 Henderson, supra note __ at 1033. 
41 Id. at 1043. 
42 Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. Ill. 2008) (Easterbrook J.). 
43 Id. at 634. 
44 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
45 Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1430-1431 (2010). 
46 See Larry E. Ribstein, Federal Misgovernance of Mutual Funds, 2009-10 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 301, 316 (describing the Jones decision). 
47 The Supreme Court did not attempt to resolve this question.  See Jones v. Harris 
Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1430-1431 (2010) (“The debate between the Seventh  
 
11 
 
B.  401(k) Plans 
  Courts and policy-makers are increasingly concerned with mutual 
fund investment decision-making, because mutual funds are the primary 
vehicle for employee retirement savings. Over the past forty years, 
employee retirement savings plans have largely shifted from defined 
benefit pension plans
48 to defined contribution plans, primarily 401(k) 
plans.
49 Both types of plans are regulated by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).
50 The effect of this shift is to 
transfer responsibility for investment decisions from the employer to 
individual employees. Although the employee directs the investment of 
his or her retirement funds in a 401(k) plan, the employer selects the 
menu of investment options available to the individual employees, who 
are limited to allocating their retirement funds among the choices 
provided.
51 
 So-called “participant control” allows the employer to reduce its 
liability exposure. Specifically, § 404(c) of ERISA exempts fiduciaries 
from liability for losses caused by participants' exercise of control over 
assets in their individual accounts.
52 As of February 2012, the 
Department of Labor estimated that 72 million individuals are covered 
                                                                                                                       
Circuit panel and the dissent from the denial of rehearing regarding today's mutual fund 
market is a matter for Congress, not the courts.”). 
48 Defined benefit plans, the category encompassing most traditional pension plans, 
promise “the participant a fixed level of retirement income, which is typically based on 
the employee's years of service and compensation.” LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & 
Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 250 n. 1 (2008) (citation omitted). 
49 Defined contribution plans promise “the participant the value of an individual 
account at retirement, which is largely a function of the amounts contributed to that 
account and the investment performance of those contributions.”  Id.  See also id. at 255 
(“[d]efined contribution plans dominate the retirement plan scene today”); Edward A. 
Zelinsky,  The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE  L.  J. 451, 471 (2004) 
(explaining that at the time that ERISSA was enacted, the defined benefit plan was the 
“dominant paradigm”). 
50 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(2). 
51 For an analysis of the effect of providing a menu of alternatives as well as the 
importance of the menu choices provided see Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 3 (2006). 
52 See also 29 CFR § 2550.404c-1 (2007).  
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by 401(k) plans in which individual participants are responsible for 
directing the investment of their retirement savings.
53 
ERISA does not restrict the types of investments that a sponsor 
may offer through a 401(k) plan – the options commonly include mutual 
funds, money market funds, real estate accounts, stable value funds, and 
company stock.
54 In order to obtain the benefit of ERISA’s section 
404(c) safe harbor, a plan must offer investors at least three “diversified” 
investment options with “materially different risk and return 
characteristics.”
55 Most 401(k) plans offer employees substantially more 
options. According to Brightscope, in 2011 the average 401(k) plan 
offered employees 24 investment options.
56 Some plans offer hundreds 
or even thousands of choices.
57 Approximately half of all 401(k) plan 
assets are invested in mutual funds.
58 
  Employers usually delegate the administration of their 401(k) 
plans to an independent service provider, which may be a bank, an 
investment company, or an insurance company.
59 The service provider 
acts as a trustee for the plan and bundles various administrative functions 
for the employer and helps the employer select the investment options. 
One study reports that mutual fund families act as trustees for 77% of 
plans.
60 Although many service providers include funds from outside the 
trustee’s family, affiliated funds tend to dominate the product lines of 
mutual fund trustees. Commentators have identified the selection of the 
trustee’s own product line as a potential conflict of interest and also 
                                                 
53 U NITED  STATES  DEPT. OF LABOR,  FACT  SHEET,  FINAL  RULE TO IMPROVE 
TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND EXPENSES TO WORKERS IN 401(K)-TYPE RETIREMENT 
PLANS (2012). 
54 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 401(K) PLANS, CERTAIN INVESTMENT 
OPTIONS AND PRACTICES  THAT  MAY  RESTRICT  WITHDRAWALS  NOT  WIDELY 
UNDERSTOOD, GAO-11-291 (2011). 
55 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B) 
56 Jack Hough, Get the Most From a Lame 401(K) Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2011. 
57 See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7
th Cir. 2009) (describing John 
Deere’s plan as offering more than 2500 investment options). 
58 Sarah Holden & David Abbey, Fortune’s Assessment of Industry Stance on 401(k) 
Fees Is Misguided, ICI VIEWPOINTS (June 25, 2012).  
59 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 401(K) PLANS, supra note __. 
60 Irina Stefanescu, Veronika Krepely Pool, & Clemens Sialm, It Pays to Set the Menu: 
Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(K) Plans (2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2112263.  
 
13 
 
found that trustees may be less inclined to remove one of their own 
underperforming funds from the plan menu.
61   
  Service providers charge various types of fees to 401(k) plan 
sponsors in connection with the provision of administrative services.
62 
Both the amount and the type of the fee can vary dramatically among 
providers.
63 A substantial percentage of plans pass through all or part of 
fees charged by their service providers to plan participants.
64 In addition 
to the plan-level fees, participants pay expenses and fees associated with 
different investment options offered by the plan, such as mutual fund 
expenses and transaction fees. 
  ERISA imposes fiduciary obligations on the sponsor in 
connection with the selection of investment options, and sponsor 
contracts with service providers typically vest authority for the selection 
of investment options in the plan sponsor.
65 Fiduciaries are required to 
select and periodically evaluate the plan’s mix and range of investment 
options.
66 In evaluating whether the sponsor has adhered to its 
obligations, courts have evaluated the “the range of investment options 
and the characteristics of those available options, including the risk 
profiles, investment strategies, and associated fees.”
67   
  Commentators have debated what these fiduciary obligations 
mean, specifically the extent to which they require sponsors to choose 
                                                 
61 Id. 
62 In response to a GAO study which found that many plan sponsors did not know or 
understand the fees charged by their plans, (see GOVERNMENT  ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE,  401(K)  PLANS  INCREASED  EDUCATIONAL  OUTREACH AND BROADER 
OVERSIGHT MAY HELP REDUCE PLAN FEES, GAO-12-325 (2012)), the Department of 
Labor adopted new regulations, effective in July of 2012, requiring detailed fee 
disclosure from service providers to plan sponsors. 29 CFR §2550.408b-2 (Feb. 2012). 
See also Mary Beth Franklin, New fee disclosure rules could shake up 401(k) world, 
INVESTMENTNEWS (June 24, 2012), describing new disclosure requirements and 
predicting their effect).  In addition, the regulations require, as of August 30, 2012, that 
fee information be disclosed to plan participants. 
63 See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INCREASED EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH 
AND  BROADER  OVERSIGHT  MAY  HELP  REDUCE  PLAN  FEES,  GAO-12-325  (2012) 
(describing range and types of fees). 
64  See id. at 16.  See also id. at 21 (stating that “[p]articipants generally paid part or all 
of the fees charged for key 401(k) plan services.”). 
65 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). See, e.g., Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 323 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
66 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d at 326. 
67 Id.  
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the lowest-cost mutual fund options.
68 Commentators have also debated 
the extent to which sponsors effectively minimize investment costs. 
Although some argue that retirement plan fees are unduly expensive and 
that, in particular, the mutual fund options offered by 401(k) plans are 
more costly and less attractive than available alternatives,
69 others 
dispute those claims.
70 
  With the formation of BrightScope, in 2009, employers face 
increasing public scrutiny of their 401(k) plans.
71  Using a proprietary 
formula, BrightScope collects and analyzes publicly available data about 
thousands of employer-sponsored 401(k) plans and publishes the results 
through a series of on-line ratings and rankings.
72  Although BrightScope 
claims to include over 200 separate inputs in its analysis, its 
methodology focuses primarily on the speed with which a plan 
participant can accumulate sufficient savings to retire.
73  This approach 
has been criticized as skewing BrightScope’s ratings results in favor of 
issuers that have highly compensated employees or generous employer-
matching provisions.
74  BrightScope does, however, analyze investment 
menu quality, noting that recent academic studies have highlighted 
“major deficiencies” in plan-level investment menus.
75  The BrightScope 
ratings have generated substantial publicity and caused many employers 
to rethink the structure of their plans.
76 
  Courts faced with legal challenges to 401(k) plans have largely 
focused on whether employers have offered a sufficient number of 
sufficiently different investment options, rather than the quality of those 
                                                 
68 Christopher Carosa, 401k Plan Sponsors and the Mutual Fund Expense Ratio Wild 
Goose Chase, FIDUCIARY NEWS, (July 3, 2012). 
69 Scott Cendrowski, Is your 401(k) ripping you off?, CNN MONEY, June 25, 2012, 
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/06/25/retirement-guide-401k-fees/. 
70 Holden & Abbey, supra note __. 
71 See Lieber, supra note __ (describing formation of BrightScope). 
72 Id. 
73 See BrightScope website, Frequency Asked Questions, What is a BrightScope 
Rating?, http://www.brightscope.com/faq/401k-retirement/. 
74 See, e.g.., Amy Feldman, How Good is Your 401(k)?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
(Dec. 30,  2009); Steve Utkus, Rating Your 401(k), Vanguard Blog (March 15, 2010),  
http://www.vanguardblog.com/2010.03.15/rating-your-
401k.html?linkLocation=insights_overview. 
75 Ryan Alfred & David Allison, BRIGHTSCOPE INVESTMENT MENU QUALITY WHITE 
PAPER, at 3. 
76 See, e.g., Michelle Rafter, BrightScope Shines a Light on 401(k) Plans, WORKFORCE, 
(March 10, 2010), (reporting that employers are “making adjustments to their 
retirement plans because of BrightScope”).  
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options or the choice architecture. In a number of recent cases, 
employees have sued their employers, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty 
based on the employer’s failure to select appropriate investment options 
and, in particular, to offer mutual fund options with sufficiently low 
costs.
77 In many of these cases, the courts have concluded that the 
employer has fulfilled its fiduciary obligations merely by offering its 
employees a sufficient range of investment options. Market competition 
and investor choice, the cases suggest, provide employees with adequate 
protection.  
In  Hecker v. John Deere,
78 for example, the Plan offered 
employees “a generous choice of investment options” that included “23 
different Fidelity mutual funds, two investment funds managed by 
Fidelity Trust, a fund devoted to Deere's stock, and a Fidelity-operated 
facility called BrokerageLink, which gave participants access to some 
2,500 additional funds managed by different companies.”
79 All the funds 
“were available on the open market for the same fee.”
80 As the court 
explained, “the undisputed facts [left] no room for doubt that the Deere 
Plans offered a sufficient mix of investments for their participants…. 
Importantly, all of these funds were also offered to investors in the 
general public, and so the expense ratios necessarily were set against the 
backdrop of market competition.”
81 Similarly, in Renfro v. Unisys 
Corp.,
82 the court concluded that an employer met its obligations by 
providing an adequate range and mix of investment options – in the case 
of Unisys, the plan offered “seventy-three distinct investment options.”
83   
  In contrast, the court in Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores refused to 
dismiss similar allegations concerning Wal-Mart’s 401(k) plan.
84 Braden 
alleged that Wal-Mart included funds with unreasonably high fees in its 
401(k) plan, due in part to alleged fee-sharing between the funds and 
                                                 
77 The basis for this litigation stems from the Supreme Court’s holding in LaRue v. 
DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008), where the court noted that “a 
participant in a defined contribution pension plan [may] sue a fiduciary whose alleged 
misconduct impaired the value of plan assets in the participant's individual account.” 
78 Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7
th Cir. 2009). 
79 Id. at 578. 
80 Id. at 579. 
81 Id. at 586. 
82 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011).  
83 Id. at 327. 
84 588 F.3d 585, 596 (8th Cir. Mo. 2009)  
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Merrill Lynch, the plan’s trustee.
85 Braden claimed that this resulted in 
the Plan paying $20 million per year in excessive fees. 
  The Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s complaint adequately 
alleged that Wal-Mart breached its fiduciary duty in selecting investment 
options for the company’s 401(k) plan. “Taken as true, and considered as 
a whole, the complaint's allegations [were] understood to assert that the 
Plan include[d] a relatively limited menu of funds which were selected 
by Wal-Mart executives despite the ready availability of better options. 
The complaint allege[d], moreover, that these options were chosen to 
benefit the trustee at the expense of the participants.”
86 The court noted, 
in particular, that Wal-Mart offered a limited number of options 
consisting of “ten retail mutual funds, a collective trust, Wal-Mart stock, 
and a stable value fund.”
87 Comparing Wal-Mart’s plan to John Deere’s 
plan, which offered its participants access to more than 2,500 mutual 
funds, the court stated that the “far narrower range of investment options 
available in this case makes more plausible the claim that this Plan was 
imprudently managed.”
88 The court stated that the fact that Wal-Mart 
offered its employees a choice among only ten mutual fund options made 
“more plausible the claim that this Plan was imprudently managed.”
89   
  These 401(k) fiduciary duty cases are premised on two critical 
assumptions. First, they assume that market forces adequately protect 
mutual fund investors from excessive fees. Second, they reflect the 
courts’ perception that employers best serve their employees’ interests 
by offering a large menu of investment options. As the next section 
suggests, research has cast doubt upon the accuracy of both of these 
assumptions.  In particular, employers can easily sabotage their 
employees’ investment decisions by offering plan choices that are too 
expensive, too complex, or simply too numerous.
90 
II.  THE LITERATURE ON INVESTOR DECISION-MAKING 
                                                 
85 Following the court’s decision, Wal-Mart and Merrill Lynch agreed to a $13.5 
million settlement of the litigation. See William P. Barrett, Walmart, Merrill Lynch 
Agree To Pay $13.5 Million To Settle 401(k) Fiduciary Lawsuit, FORBES,  (Dec. 5, 
2011). 
86 Id. at 596. 
87 Id. at 589. 
88 Id. at 596 n. 6. 
89 Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 596 n.6 (2009). 
90 See, e.g., Charles D. Ellis, Murder on the Orient Express: The Mystery of 
Underperformance, 68 FIN. ANAL. J. 13 (2012) (criticizing employers for investing in 
higher cost actively managed funds in a futile search for outperformance).  
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Understanding consumer investment behavior is critical because 
the regulatory structure described above is based in part on assumptions 
about how individuals make investment decisions. Empirical studies 
demonstrate a wide variety of investor mistakes ranging from saving too 
little to trading too frequently.
91  Investors lack basic financial literacy 
including the ability to understand the effect of compounding or to 
construct a diversified portfolio.  Our study focuses on a widely-reported 
investor mistake – the willingness to invest in high fee funds despite the 
evidence that such funds consistently underperform the market. The 
persistence of this behavior weighs against the claim that competition in 
the market for mutual funds can keep fees low without regulatory 
oversight. 
A.  Cost-Sensitive Investing 
Studies strongly suggest that, of the information available to 
retail investors, fund expenses are the best predictor of future returns, 
and that lower expenses are correlated with higher returns.
92 
Morningstar’s Director of Mutual Fund Research has observed, “[i]f 
there’s anything in the whole world of mutual funds that you can take to 
the bank, it’s that expense ratios help you make a better decision.”
93 In 
one recent study, Cooper, Halling, and Lemmon found that among the 
funds in their sample, lower-fee funds outperformed otherwise 
observably identical higher-fee funds by 32%.
94 
The literature in this area is extensive, and the results of some 
studies conflict.
95 Nonetheless, most studies find that high-fee funds 
underperform both their lower fee competitors
96 and passively managed 
                                                 
91 See, e.g., THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS AND 
PITFALLS OF U.S. INVESTORS (2010) (summarizing economic studies of investor 
mistakes). 
92 See Fisch, supra note __ at 1993 (summarizing studies). 
93 Morningstar compared the predictive power of its star ratings (which take into 
account expenses as well as other variables) to expense ratios alone, and found that 
expense ratio alone was a better predictor of future fund performance than the star 
ratings in a majority of the years analyzed. Russel Kinnel, How Expense Ratios and 
Star Ratings Predict Success, MORNINGSTAR, Aug. 9, 2012, 
http://news.morningstar.com/ARTICLENET/ARTICLE.ASPX?ID=347327). 
94 Cooper, et al., supra note __.   
95 See Martijn Cremers, et al., The Mutual Fund Industry Worldwide (2011), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830207 (identifying the conflicting literature). 
96 Michael J. Cooper, Michael Halling, & Michael L. Lemmon, Violations of the Law of 
One Fee in the Mutual Fund Industry (2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456079; Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, The Relation  
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index funds that provide a market rate of return.
97 Although there is 
evidence that some managers have superior stock-picking ability that 
persists over time,
98 many studies find that managers are not able to beat 
the market over the long run.
99 Even if some funds consistently 
outperform the market, the percentage of funds that do so appears to be 
quite small, and it is unlikely that the average retail investor is capable of 
identifying outperformers. 
Nonetheless, investors continue to purchase higher fee funds. The 
reason for this behavior is unclear.
100 Some investors appear to believe 
that higher fees are correlated with better performance, in accordance 
with the adage, “you get what you pay for.”
101 Other investors appear to 
underestimate the economic significance of fund fees.
102 And for others, 
fees may be presented in a manner that is too complex or difficult to 
                                                                                                                       
Between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153, 2154 
(2009); John A. Haslem et al., Identification and Performance of Equity Mutual Funds 
with High Management Fees and Expense Ratios, 16 J. INVESTING 32 (2007). 
97 Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 
53 J. OF FIN. 783 (1996). 
98 Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New 
Measure That Predicts Performance 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (finding that the most 
active funds, as opposed to closet indexers, can outperform their benchmarks net of 
fees.) See also Robert Kosowski et al., Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks?: 
New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551 (2006); Baker et al., Can 
Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from Their Trades Prior to Earnings 
Announcements, 45 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 1111 (2010). 
99 Ronald N. Kahn & Andrew Rudd, Does Historical Performance Predict Future 
Performance?, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 43 (1995); Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in 
Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 (1997); Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Jeffrey A. 
Busse, Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 
594-95 (2004). 
100 The empirical findings may be complicated by the fact that some mutual fund fees 
are directly used to market funds.  Studies have shown that loads and 12b-1 fees have a 
positive effect on market share.  See Ajay Khorana, What Drives Market Share in the 
Mutual Fund Industry?, 16 REV. FIN. 81 (2012). 
101  See Neil Weinberg, Fund Managers Know Best, FORBES 220 (Oct. 14, 2002) 
(finding that many investors believe higher fee funds are better performers). 
102 John Beshears et al., How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals’ Mutual 
Funds Choice?, in EXPLORATIONS IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING (University of Chicago 
Press 2011). One recent study finds that investors overwhelmingly rely on past 
performance rather than cost information and select funds with high past performance 
even when cost information is completely omitted. See Beth A. Pontari et al., 
Regulating Information Disclosure in Mutual Fund Advertising, 32 J. CONSUM. POLICY 
333 (2009).  
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find.
103 As former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt testified before Congress in 
1998, “[o]ur own research shows that fewer than one in five fund 
investors could give any estimate of expenses for their largest mutual 
fund and fewer than one in six fund investors understood that higher 
expenses can lead to lower returns.”
104  
These studies offer reason to question the degree to which the 
mutual fund market is competitive, despite investors’ ability to redeem 
mutual fund shares at any time for their net asset value and to replace 
those funds with others that are competitively priced.
105 The law of one 
price suggests that similar products should have similar prices and that 
fee dispersion should not persist unless products are truly different.
106  
Nonetheless, substantial price dispersion persists in the mutual fund 
market – price dispersion that does not appear to be explained by product 
differences.
107 One recent paper found that, after controlling for fund 
characteristics, “the average spread in residual fees (between the 1st and 
99th percentile) across all funds over the sample [was] 2.34%.”
108 
                                                 
103 See, e.g., Brad M. Barber et al., Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of Expenses 
on Mutual Fund Flows, 78 J.  BUS. 2095, 2107 (2005) (finding that investors have 
learned to reject high load funds, but continue to ignore operating expenses). See also 
Mark Grinblatt, et al., IQ and Mutual Fund Choice (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021957 (finding that investors 
with high IQs tended to avoid higher fee funds). But see James J. Choi et al, Why Does 
the Law of One Price Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 
1405 (2010) (finding that almost none of subject minimized fees despite reporting 
importance of fees, but that minimizing search costs only modestly improved portfolio 
allocations). 
104 Arthur Levitt, The Numbers Game, Speech at NYU Law School (Sept. 28, 1998), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.  
105 A number of articles argue that the mutual fund market is competitive. See, e.g., 
Ajay Khorana & Henri Servaes, What Drives Market Share in the Mutual Fund 
Industry?, __ REV. FIN. __ (forthcoming 2012) (finding that higher-fee fund families 
have lower market shares); Sunil Wahal & Albert Wang, Competition among mutual 
funds, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 40 (2011), (finding that the mutual fund market, at least after 
1998, is competitive and that the price competition introduced by new entrants reduces 
management fees).  
106  See Choi et al, supra note __ (questioning whether demand for non-portfolio 
services can justify higher fees). 
107 Peter Wallison & Robert E. Litan, COMPETITIVE EQUITY (2007). See also Choi, et 
al., supra note __ (finding substantial fee variation among index funds that are designed 
to follow an identical and largely mechanical investment strategy). 
108 Cooper et al., supra note__, at 4.  
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Another study found that, even in the absence of product differences, 
investors failed to minimize fees.
109 
B.  Diversification 
  In addition to evidence that investors do not choose funds based 
on price, there is some evidence that investors do not choose at all—
instead, they simply divide their money among the available options, an 
approach that has been termed “naïve diversification”
110 Bernartzi and 
Thaler first demonstrated this phenomenon in a series of experiments in 
2001.
111 They found that subjects asked to make investment decisions 
had a strong inclination to spread their money, essentially investing 1/n 
into each of the n funds that was offered as investment choices 
irrespective of the particular choice set or the attributes of the options at 
hand.  
Research has also demonstrated that investors formulate their 
asset allocation decisions based on the alternatives provided rather than 
independently determining an appropriate allocation.
112 This approach 
has been termed the “menu effect.”
113 The menu effect, coupled with 
naïve diversification may lead investors to fail to reject even unattractive 
investment options. If investors do not reject less attractive options, 
offering them a range of choices does not prevent poor investment 
decisions, and may counterproductively induce them.   
Finally, as noted above, policies that favor choice itself may be 
misguided given evidence of the effects of many choices on decision-
making quality. Investors express a preference for choosing from a large 
assortment of products,
114 but it isn’t clear that more choice is better for 
investors in retirement accounts. First, increasing the number of 
                                                 
109 Choi et al, supra note __.  
110 Schlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined 
Contribution Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79-98 (2001). 
111 Id. 
112  See also Nina Tang, et al., The efficiency of sponsor and participant portfolio 
choices in 401(k) plans, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073 (2010) (finding that investors fail to 
construct efficient retirement portfolios, where efficiency is designed as maximizing 
their risk-adjusted return, and that individual allocation strategy are even less efficient 
than using a 1/n heuristic). 
113 Maureen Morrin, et al., Saving for Retirement: The Effects of Fund Assortment Size 
and Investor Knowledge on Asset Allocation Strategies, 42 J. CONSUM. AFF. 206 (Jul 
2008). 
114 Id.   
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investment options increases investors’ tendency to invest in a large 
number of funds, although a very large number of choices appears to 
reduce the extent to which investors engage in complete naïve 
diversification as discussed above.
115 Second, and more problematically, 
increasing the amount of choice actually may lower employee 
participation rates. In one recent article, researchers looked at a broad 
collection of data on investment decisions made by over 500,000 
employees and found that increasing the number of investment options 
decreased both equity allocation and overall investment levels.
116    
C. Proposed Mechanisms and Proposed Solutions for Investor 
Mistakes 
  Although the empirical literature identifies a variety of possible 
shortcomings in investor decision-making, the precise mechanisms 
driving the choice of high-fee funds remain unclear. One possibility is 
that investment disclosure is inadequate. The SEC has repeatedly revised 
and refined its disclosure requirements for mutual funds in an effort to 
address the concern that investors do not choose their funds rationally.
117 
Yet one of the more recent studies to examine the effectiveness of these 
reforms found that the introduction of the summary prospectus had no 
effect on investor behavior.
118 
  Another possibility is that investors are inadequately informed 
about the task at hand or the fundamentals of investing. When investing 
for retirement, for example, employees are not typically provided with 
instructions such as the appropriate number of options to choose or the 
correct allocation between equity and fixed income. Investors do not 
receive training in the difference between active and passive 
management. Investors are not even instructed as to the importance of 
fees in selecting among investment alternatives. And at an even more 
basic level, people are confused about the math. Finance scholars 
Lusardi and Mitchell found that more than half of participants in a 
demographically diverse sample did not realize that mutual funds do not 
pay a guaranteed rate of return, and fewer than 20% could correctly 
                                                 
115 See Morrin, supra note __ (“considering a larger number of funds to invest in may 
be overwhelming for many investors, resulting in choosing more funds for investment 
and allocating the invested dollars evenly across the chosen funds”). 
116 Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One 
Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 995 (2000).   
117 See Fisch, supra note __. 
118 Beshears, supra note __.  
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answer a multiple-choice question about the calculation of compound 
interest.
119 
Even ideal disclosure requirements will have limited 
effectiveness, though, if investors are unable to use the information 
provided.
120 Lack of investor education or overtaxed cognitive resources 
might explain the inability of investors to estimate the costs associated 
with a 1% difference in fees, for example, or the willingness of investors, 
even post-Enron, to invest a substantial portion of their retirement 
accounts in company stock. To the extent that these shortcomings are 
due to behavioral biases, little effort has been made to overcome them.
121 
The literature continually identifies the inability of investors to 
demonstrate a basic understanding of investment principles, but little 
effort has been devoted to determining how to improve that 
understanding.   
Understanding the reasons for existing investor behavior is 
critical to designing more effective regulatory approaches. As noted 
above, Congress recognized as much when, as part of Dodd-Frank, it 
required the SEC to conduct a study of investor financial literacy.
122 The 
report of the study, which the SEC released on August 30, 2012, was a 
disappointment.
123 Although Congress had directed the SEC to identify 
the existing level of financial literacy among retail investors and to study 
such issues as designing more effective disclosure and identifying a 
strategy to improve financial literacy, the SEC’s efforts were extremely 
limited.  
                                                 
119 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial literacy and retirement planning 
in the United States, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 509 (2011).   
120 See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 521 (2009) (arguing that, in the absence of investor education, SEC 
disclosure rules do not lead investors to make better investment decisions). 
121 In the one area in which such biases appear clear – the tendency of investors to place 
undue weight on past performance – the regulatory response has been tepid.  Rather 
than limiting advertisements highlighting past performance, despite their substantial 
influence on investment decisions, the SEC simply requires such advertisements to 
contain language informing investors that “past performance does not guarantee future 
results.”  See Molly Mercer, et al., Worthless Warnings: Testing the Effectiveness of 
Disclaimers in Mutual Fund Advertisements, 7 J.  EMPIR.  LEG.  STUD. 429 (2010) 
(explaining that past performance advertising is highly effective and demonstrating that 
current SEC disclaimer is too weak). 
122 Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 13, at § 917. 
123 SEC PRESS RELEASE, SEC ISSUES FINANCIAL LITERACY STUDY MANDATED BY THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT (2012).  
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The study concluded that U.S. retail investors “lack basic 
financial literacy,”
124 but the SEC focused primarily on investor 
preferences rather than attempting to identify mechanisms to improve the 
quality of investor decisions.  For example, the SEC conducted a 
substantial online survey, in which subjects were given investment 
information to review.
125 The SEC did not question the investors on their 
understanding of the material provided but on their perceptions of the 
presentation and complexity of the information provided. For example, 
rather than trying to determine whether investors could reliably locate 
information contained in a summary prospectus, the SEC asked them 
whether they found it difficult to locate the information that they 
needed.
126 
Although the SEC study offered little of practical value, an 
improved understanding of retail investor decision-making can assist 
regulators in improving the manner in which approximately $19 million 
of U.S. retirement assets are invested.
127 This information could also 
assist employers in designing retirement plans to optimize allocation 
decisions by employees. Furthering these objectives require untangling 
the reasons for investor mistakes.  Do investors fail to identify the proper 
objectives?  Are they unable to locate the information that they need?  Or 
are they unable to evaluate that information accurately?  Our experiment, 
described in the next section, offers an initial step toward obtaining this 
understanding.         
III.  OUR EXPERIMENT 
To increase understanding of how retail investors make 
investment decisions, we designed an experiment to simulate the process 
of allocating a retirement account among a selection of mutual funds. 
Our experiment created a web-based user interface to provide subjects 
with ten fictional mutual fund choices. Information about each of the 
choices was provided through clickable links. Investors allocated an 
investment among the ten funds and our software recorded their 
                                                 
124 SEC STAFF STUDY, supra note 2, at iii. 
125 Investors were given summary prospectuses of several mutual funds, but the fund 
names were changed to the fictitious “Petunia,” “Gardenia” and “Hydrangea” funds.  
Id. 
126 Id. 
127 As of June 30, 2012, US retirement assets totaled $18.5 trillion. INVESTMENT 
COMPANY  INSTITUTE,  RETIREMENT  ASSETS  TOTAL  $18.5  TRILLION IN SECOND 
QUARTER 2012, RETIREMENT STATISTICS (2012).  
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allocation decisions.  In addition, our website required investors to click 
through the site in order to obtain specific information about fund 
choices and their attributes.  Because our technology allowed us to 
collect these clicks, we are able to identify which information investors 
reviewed.  After the subjects submitted their allocations, we collected 
additional survey information about the subjects’ beliefs, risk 
preferences and investment experience, as well as demographic 
information. 
A.  Study Design 
Subjects were instructed to allocate an initial $10,000 among the 
ten fund choices. The experiment did not permit subjects to submit an 
allocation unless their allocations totaled exactly 100% of the $10,000. 
The subjects were told that they were investing for retirement and that 
the overall value of their portfolio would be calculated based on a 
simulated thirty-year performance. We attempted to provide an incentive 
for subjects to allocate carefully by instructing them that they would be 
paid a bonus based on the performance of the portfolio that they 
chose.
128 
Our fund allocation page (Figure 1) listed the ten mutual fund 
choices. By clicking on the fund name, subjects accessed a fund 
information page (Figure 2) that provided a brief description of the fund.  
In turn, the fund information page contained four buttons allowing 
subjects to obtain information on four specific fund attributes – 
performance, risk, fees and holdings.  Each button allowed subjects to 
click through to obtain more detailed information (Figure 3). 
  
                                                 
128 See section IIIB (describing performance bonuses paid to each group of subjects).  
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Figure 1. Fund allocation page 
 
Figure 2. Fee information page, money market fund 
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Figure 3. Money market fund with performance information shown 
 
 
The information provided for each fund was presented in an 
identical and highly simplified format.  Our study was designed to focus 
on information and motivation-based reasons for investor mistakes rather 
than cognitive reasons for such mistakes.  As a result, we highlighted the 
information that might conceivably be relevant to the investment 
decision and made that information directly comparable across the fund 
options. 
Performance information included a graph showing the fund’s 
ten-year performance as well as the performance of the S&P 500 (over 
the same hypothetical time period) and a chart showing annualized one-, 
three- and five-year returns. Fee information consisted of a single 
number showing the fund’s current expense ratio.  Our study was 
specifically constructed to reduce the likelihood that investor choices  
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were due to confusion or inability to understand the fee disclosure.
129 
Risk description language was taken from real mutual fund prospectuses, 
and the holdings page listed each funds’ top ten holdings and showed the 
percentage of fund assets invested in each, again modeled on actual 
funds. 
 
As noted above, the funds in the experiment were modeled on 
real world funds – fee levels, holdings and descriptive language were 
taken from real mutual fund documents. The choice to construct fictional 
funds was driven in part by a desire to avoid the potentially distortionary 
effect of the Financial Crisis of 2008 on reported fund performance. In 
addition, using fictional funds also allowed us to control the degree to 
which funds differed from each other.  For example, we constructed 
several fund pairs that varied across only a single dimension, such as 
fees. 
We gave our funds generic names such as the Smith Fund, much 
like those used in the SEC study of investor literacy,
130 to avoid the 
possibility that investors would infer information about fund style or 
strategy from the names of the funds.
131 On the fund allocation page, we 
also randomly varied the order in which funds appeared within their fund 
category. A simplified presentation of fund attributes appears in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
129 We did not include loads, 12b-1 fees, sponsor fee waivers or other types of 
expenses.  Haslem has argued that investors lack the information they need to make 
efficient fund choices because the expense ratio does not break out all costs or include 
all cost categories.  Haslem, supra note __.  
130 The SEC named its fictional funds “Petunia Core Equity,” “Gardenia Asset 
Allocation Portfolio,” and “Hydrangea Bush Government Bond Fund.”  SEC Staff 
Study, supra note 2. 
131 See Michael J. Cooper, et al., Changing Names with Style: Mutual Fund Name 
Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows, 60 J. FIN. 2825 (2005) (finding investors 
directed money into funds that changed their names to reflect a “hot investment style”).  
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Table 1.  Fund Attributes 
Fund Type  5-year  return  Fees 
1 Money  Market  2.89%  .43% 
2 Money  Market  2.91%  .43% 
3 Fixed  Income  7.5% .87% 
4 Fixed  Income  5.41%  .83% 
5 Equity  Index 8.67%  .10% 
6 Equity  Index 8.62%  .45% 
7 Managed  Equity  9.1% .61% 
8 Managed  Equity  8.67%  .61% 
9 Managed  Equity  9.0% 1.62% 
10 Managed  Equity  9.7%  2.1% 
 
We collected information on how subjects allocated their $10,000 
as well as the specific clicks that each subject made in order to view 
additional information about the funds. After the subjects submitted their 
allocations, they were asked to answer a series of questions about their 
investment beliefs, risk preferences and investment experience. Subjects 
were also asked to supply demographic information and to identify “the 
most important factor in my choice of retirement funds in this study.”   
After completing the questionnaire, subjects received a message 
showing the final value of their retirement portfolio. The website 
calculated this value by using a rough algorithm simulating fund returns 
over thirty years. Returns were ranked by asset class.
132 Consistent with 
our hypothesis, funds within each class were ranked so that funds with 
lower fees yielded higher returns. Because we were agnostic, for 
purposes of this study,
133 about the relative merits of professionally 
                                                 
132 Equity funds paid a higher return than bond funds, which paid more than money 
market funds. Our algorithm also included an adjustment factor for risk, a component 
of our experiment that is analyzed in a separate article.   
133 Commentators generally agree that retail investors should prefer passively managed 
funds both because of their lower costs and because investors lack the ability to select 
among mutual fund managers.  See, e.g., Rick Ferri, Indexes Beat Active Funds Again 
in S&P Study, Forbes.com, Oct. 11, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickferri/2012/10/11/indexes-beat-active-funds-again-in- 
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managed funds versus passive indexing, we structured the returns of our 
lowest cost index fund and actively managed equity fund to be identical 
on a cost-adjusted basis. The distribution of possible portfolio values and 
fees is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Distribution of possible fees and payouts 
Maximum Portfolio Value (100% invested in 
highest performing fund) 
$76,120 
Minimum Portfolio Value (100% invested in lowest 
performing fund) 
$15,630 
Portfolio Value with 10% invested in each fund  $38,989-49,543 
Maximum Fee (100% invested in highest fee fund)  2.1% 
Minimum Fee (100% invested in lowest fee fund)  .10% 
Average fee (effective fee with 10% invested in 
each fund) 
.81% 
 
B.  Subjects 
Our study drew from two subject pools. Table 3 contains basic 
demographic information on each group of subjects. The first group of 
subjects was made up of undergraduate students, graduate students, and 
some staff who took the study at the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Wharton Behavioral Lab (WBL). The Wharton Behavioral Lab draws 
subjects from across the University of Pennsylvania campus, primarily 
undergraduates. Its subjects are not confined to students affiliated with 
the Wharton business program. 
The second group of subjects signed up through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and took the study online. Although some 
scholars have raised questions about the external validity of online 
subject pools like Amazon Turk that pay subjects very small amounts for 
small tasks and short questionnaires,
134 others have found that they are 
                                                                                                                       
sp-study/  (detailing consistent underperformance of actively-managed funds and 
portfolios). 
134 See Armin Falk & Ernst Fahr, Why Labour Market Experiments?, 10 LABOUR ECON. 
399, 402 (2003) (exploring the role of stake levels); see also Ernst Fehr & John List, 
The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs, 
2 J. EURO. ECON. ASS’N 743 (2004) (finding differences in the behavior of students and 
CEOs in studies concerning the effect of incentives).  
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comparable to other survey panels.
135 Our goal in this study was to 
simulate the allocation decision faced by ordinary employees choosing 
among investment options in their 401(k) plans. Using subjects who may 
have below-average means or sophistication is appropriate for a study 
that seeks to describe and address the investment choices of employees 
with little specialized knowledge or investment experience.
136 
Table 3. Subject demographics, by subject pool. 
  MTurk WBL 
Total number of subjects  197  201 
Median age  32  20 
Percent female  52%  67% 
Percent owning a mutual fund  43.1%  12.9% 
Percent who have a retirement 
account 
54.9% 8.5% 
Percent with college education   58.4%  33.8% 
Percent reporting somewhat to very 
stable income 
67.0% 71.6% 
 
We incentivized our subjects to select funds carefully by 
providing a performance-based bonus. MTurk participants were paid a 
base rate of $1 for completing the study and an additional $1 bonus if 
their portfolio value was above the median in that subject pool. Subjects 
who participated in the study via the Wharton Behavioral Lab were paid 
a $10 show-up fee for a session that included this experiment as well as 
other studies. They were instructed that they would also receive a bonus 
payment proportionate to their total portfolio value at the end of the 
session – one dollar for every $10,000 in their portfolio (rounded to the 
nearest quarter). 
                                                 
135 U.S. workers on Mechanical Turk are arguably closer to the U.S. population as a 
whole than subjects recruited from traditional university subject pools. See Gabriele 
Paolacci, Jesse Chandler, & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDG. & DECISION MAKING 411 (2010).  
136 We note that the self-reported education level of Mechanical Turk subjects is higher 
than that of the general population. See id.  
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C.  Experimental Manipulation 
We focus on investors’ consideration of fees in their allocation 
decisions, in part because of the extensive controversy over the extent to 
which investment decisions provide market discipline and in part 
because of the legal implications of the answer to this question.  To test 
the potential for education to affect investors’ consideration of fees, our 
experiment contained an experimental manipulation.  Specifically, we 
divided our subjects randomly into three groups – Performance, Fees and 
Control.  We provided subjects in the Fees group with an instruction 
designed to focus investors on the importance of considering fee 
information in the selection process.   
Fee Condition Instruction: 
In making your investment decision, you may want to 
consider the following information: The most important 
single factor in mutual fund performance is the fund’s 
operating expenses (in other words, its fees). 
We provided subjects in the Performance Group with an 
instruction comparable to the instruction required by the SEC.   
Performance Condition Instruction: 
In making your investment decision, you may want to 
consider the following information: studies have shown that 
past performance does not predict future returns. 
Subjects in the Control condition did not receive any additional 
instruction.  Because of the complex relationship between fees and 
performance, as noted in Part II above, we consider the effect of the 
performance instruction in other work.  We report here only on the 
comparison of the Fees Group and the Control Group.   
As a robustness check, we also asked participants who received a 
special instruction in the questionnaire portion of the experiment to 
identify the instruction that they received from a list of seven 
alternatives.
137 
                                                 
137 49.2% of the Turk Group and 57.2% of the Wharton Group correctly identified their 
own condition.   
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IV.  STUDY RESULTS 
A.  Overall Descriptive Results 
We report data from 197 Amazon Turk subjects and 201 
University of Pennsylvania subjects. Because of the demographic 
differences between our groups, we report results separately.
138   
To summarize, our overall results provide a basis for guarded 
optimism are as follows. First, we found that investors understood the 
general objectives and design of the study – they invested, in the 
aggregate, the most money in the two funds that we had designed to be 
the most efficient investment options – the low cost equity index fund 
and the low cost actively managed fund.  Second, we found that 
investors diversified, probably excessively, but we found segmentation 
within our investor pool. Third, we found that the fee instruction 
mattered. These results are considered in more detail below. 
Table 4. Basic descriptive means, by subject pool 
  MTurk WBL 
Minutes logged in  12.7  11.3 
Total clicks  34.3  59.0 
Mean clicks on fees  6.86  11.77 
Mean clicks on risk  4.70  9.32 
Mean clicks on holdings  3.25  7.08 
Mean clicks on performance  7.98  13.76 
Total number of funds invested in  6.39  7.33 
Percent Investing in all 10 funds  27.9%  32.4% 
Percent correctly identifying own 
condition 
49.2% 57.2% 
Average portfolio value  $47,679  $48,839 
Average pay  $1.50  $4.91 
 
The subjects from the two pools were very similar in terms of 
their overall choices and performance in the task, with some important 
exceptions. The University of Pennsylvania subjects accessed a much 
higher quantity of information, clicking through many more links. The 
MTurk subjects invested in fewer overall funds, and were less likely to 
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invest in all ten funds. We also note here, as is reflected in the 
significance tests below, that there is generally more variance in the data 
from the Turk subjects. 
Figure 5 shows the mean investment across conditions in each 
fund. Figure 6 shows the overall distribution across subjects of the 
debt/equity split.  
B.  Investment Patterns 
Before discussing the results of our experimental manipulation, 
we observe some overall patterns in how subjects chose funds across 
conditions in order to get a sense of subjects’ baseline preferences and 
strategies. First, we note that most subjects chose a reasonable 
debt/equity balance (see Figure 5), and that the most popular investments 
were the two investments that should have been the most attractive – the 
low-fee index fund and the low-fee managed fund. Figure 6 shows the 
mean investment in each fund, by subject pool. Note that Figure 6 shows 
the means aggregated across conditions, but the overall pattern is the 
same if we look only at subjects in the Control condition. 
Second, we see substantial evidence of a strong preference for 
diversification, naïve or otherwise
139; from these patterns of investment it 
seems clear that subjects were not trying to pick funds. We expected 
investors would attempt to identify the best fund in each category and to 
invest in two or three funds, depending on the extent to which they 
wanted to diversify between fixed income and equity and between 
passive and active investment strategies – subjects about which we 
remained agnostic for purposes of this study. Instead, we found that only 
7.5% of WBL and 17.8% of MTurk subjects chose three or fewer funds.  
The results on diversification are less discouraging than might 
appear from the aggregated statistics on average number of funds 
invested in, however.  Specifically, we see segmentation within our 
subject pools. As Figure 5 bears out, our aggregate results on 
diversification combine different investment patterns. In the WBL pool, 
for example, about a third of subjects invested in 4-6 total funds, and 
only a third invested in all ten funds. Although the subjects who invested 
in all ten funds – those who diversified most naively – do not appear to 
differ from our other subjects along the dimensions captured by our 
study, we suspect that these are different kinds of investors, and that this 
                                                 
139 See Bernartzi & Thaler, supra note __.  
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market may be segmented in some important ways that we flag here for 
future research.  
More problematically, naïve diversification may explain a 
number of investment decisions that otherwise appear irrational or 
uninformed.  For example, our study contained two index funds that 
were described as identical except for fees – they tracked the same index, 
contained the same holdings and reported the same past performance.  
74.6% of WBL participants and 65.2% of MTurk participants who 
invested in the low-fee index fund also invested in the high-fee index 
fund. Similarly, 68% of MTurk investors allocated at least some money 
to a higher-fee actively-managed fund that was really just a closet index 
fund – its holdings and performance were identical to those reported by 
the index funds -- as did 74.1% of WBL subjects. On a somewhat 
different dimension, 79.6% of WBL and 74.1% of MTurk investors and 
allocated at least some money to a money market fund even though they 
were told that they were investing for a 30-year time frame in which 
liquidity concerns should have been minimal and the reported returns of 
the money markets were significantly lower than the other fixed income 
alternatives. 
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Figure 5. Histogram showing mean percentage (aggregated across 
conditions) of portfolio invested in each fund, by subject pool 
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Figure 6. Histogram showing mean percentage (aggregated across 
conditions) of total portfolio invested in equity, by subject pool
 
 
 
C.  Response to Fee Instruction 
In this section we analyze the effect of the Fees instruction on 
subjects’ beliefs and choices. Here we compare the responses of the 72 
WBL subjects assigned to the Fees condition with the responses of the 
60 subjects assigned to the Control condition, and separately, the 
responses of 64 subjects in the Fees condition with 65 in the Control 
condition from the MTurk pool.
140 As noted above, we exclude subjects 
in the performance group from this set of analyses.
141  
                                                 
140 We also analyzed gender differences. Men and women in the Wharton subject pool 
did not differ on any of the primary dependent variables, including portfolio 
composition and clicking patterns. Women in the Turk pool invested significantly more 
in safe (fixed income) funds than men (34.8% vs. 27.4%, p=.015). 
141 As a general matter, the behavior of those subjects who received the performance 
instruction was similar to that of the control group. For our primary variables, including 
fee clicks, average fee paid, the importance of fees and investment in the lowest and 
highest fee funds, the results of the performance group were statistically 
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We found that investors who received the Fees instruction 
differed from the control group along three dimensions – they sought 
more information about fees, they reported believing that fees were more 
important, and they shifted their allocations toward lower cost funds.
142 
1. Search for Information: Fee Clicks 
The fee disclosure significantly affected how subjects collected 
and used fee information.  As Table 5 indicates, subjects in the Fees 
group were much more likely to look at a fund’s fees. On average, WBL 
subjects in the Fees group clicked 40% more on the fees buttons, 
meaning that they viewed fee information 40% more often, than subjects 
in the control group. The increase was even more dramatic for subjects 
from the MTurk pool, where subjects in the Fees group clicked more 
than twice as often on the fee disclosure than subjects in the control 
group. In both subject pools, the Fees instruction caused investors to 
search for more fee information than the control group. 
Table 5. Fee Clicks by Condition, for WBL and MTurk samples 
  Fee Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean 
T Df  p 
Fee Clicks: WBL  14.82  10.40  3.10  129.62  .002 
Fee Clicks: MTurk  9.36  4.09  4.37  101.87  .000 
 
2. Beliefs about the Importance of Fees 
The Fees instruction also affected subjects’ beliefs about the 
importance of fund fees. We report group means and significance 
statistics for WBL participants in Table 6, and for MTurk participants in 
Table 7. The effects were very similar across subject pools. Overall, in 
both subject pools, subjects in the Fees condition were less likely than 
subjects in the control group to agree that a fund’s fees do not affect 
                                                                                                                       
indistinguishable from the control group. The performance instruction did generate 
marginal differences in the investors’ allocation among the various funds.    
142 All statistical tests reported here are two-sided t-tests, comparing the variable means 
across conditions. We report the results of the main statistical tests of significance in 
tables, including means, t-statistics, degrees of freedom, and p-value.  
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returns and were substantially more likely to report that operating 
expenses were the most important factor in fund performance.   
The most dramatic impact of the Fees instruction was on the 
subjects’ self-reported identification of the most important criterion in 
their selection among the investment alternatives. In both subject pools, 
the instruction caused a significant reduction in subjects reporting 
diversification as the most important consideration, and a corresponding 
increase in the percentage of subjects reporting that fees were the most 
important consideration. Notably, the fee instruction appeared to be new 
information to the MTurk subjects as well as the Wharton students 
despite the fact that the MTurk subjects were significantly more 
experienced investors, with over half reporting that they have a 
retirement account. 
Table 6. Beliefs and preferences by condition, WBL subjects 
  Fee Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean 
T Df  p 
Fees do not affect 
returns 
3.04 3.53 1.97  129.99  .051 
Operating expenses 
most important in 
performance 
4.31 3.16 4.38  129.35  .000 
Most important is fees  27.8%  6.7%  3.39  114.67  .001 
Most important is 
diversity 
30.6% 53.3% 2.68  121.53  .008 
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Table 7. Beliefs and preferences by condition, MTurk subjects 
  Fee Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean 
T Df  p 
Fees do not affect 
returns 
2.61 3.48 3.43  124.22  .001 
Operating expenses 
most important in 
performance 
4.28 3.25 4.75  85.95  .000 
Most important is fees  35.9%  4.6%  4.75  85.95  .000 
Most important is 
diversity 
31.3% 50.8% 2.27  126.55  .024 
 
3. Fund Selection 
Because our experiment required our subjects to make an 
investment decision, the effect of the Fees instruction on that decision is 
arguably the most important component of our experiment. It is arguably 
also the most important aspect of our study with respect to real-world 
policy choices in that it measures the potential ability of an instruction to 
affect investor behavior rather than simply attitudes or beliefs. Because 
of the importance of this question, we designed our study to measure 
potential effects in several ways. Results are summarized in Table 8 
(WBL) and Table 9 (MTurk). 
First, for each subject, we determined the asset-weighted average 
mutual fund fee that the subject’s account would have paid at the time of 
the subject’s investment allocation.
143 For example, a subject who 
invested half of his or her money in a fund with a .1% fee and half in the 
fund with a 2.1% fee had an average fund fee of 1.1%. By this measure, 
the fee instruction had a clear impact. In both pools, subjects in the Fees 
group selected portfolios charging a lower average fee than subjects in 
the control group. Perhaps more importantly, the average fee difference 
between conditions was significant even when we look only at fees paid 
on equity funds (Funds 5-10). 
                                                 
143 Differences in fund performance would cause the average fee to vary over the thirty 
years of the simulation.  
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The fee instruction also affected the subjects’ choices among 
specific investment alternatives. The Fees group invested a higher 
percentage of their portfolio in the lowest-fee fund option and a lower 
percentage of their portfolio in the highest-fee fund than the control 
group (though the latter difference is not significant in the MTurk 
group). They also invested more in index funds and less in managed 
funds than their Control counterparts. Notably, those in the Fees group 
invested more in the lower-fee index fund than those in the control 
group, but did not invest more in the higher-fee index fund than those in 
the control group, suggesting that their investment shift resulted from a 
concern about fees rather than a preference for passively over actively 
managed funds.  
 
Table 8. Fund selection by condition, WBL 
  Fee 
Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean 
T Df  p 
Average Total Fees 
Paid (asset-weighted) 
.66% .80%  3.27  129.50  .001 
Average Fees Paid in 
Equity (asset-
weighted) 
.70% .84%  2.61  129.77  .010 
Index Funds (5-6)  34.12  25.55  2.70  129.77  .008 
Managed Funds (7-
10) 
40.81 48.40  2.46  129.90  .015 
Fixed income funds 
(3-4) 
13.76 16.58  1.74  129.99  .085 
Money Market (1-2)  18.44  16.14  1.17  126.44  .246 
Average Percent of 
Portfolio Invested in 
Lowest-Fee Fund  
23.5 15.7  3.18  119.20  .002 
Average Percent of 
Portfolio Invested in 
Highest-Fee Fund 
7.15 11.42  2.31  115.34  .022 
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Table 9. Fund selection by condition, MTurk 
 
  Fee 
Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean 
T Df  p 
Average Total Fees 
Paid (asset-weighted) 
.68% .79%  2.21  125.60  .028 
Average Fees Paid in 
Equity (asset-
weighted) 
.70% .84%  2.32  124.29  .023 
Index Funds (5-6)   29.76  22.45  2.01  118.4  .047 
Managed Funds (7-10)  38.65  46.85  1.93  120.41  .056 
Fixed income funds 
(3-4) 
12.38 13.82  1.20  126.97  .232 
Money Market funds 
(1-2) 
19.21 15.88  1.11  112.47  .268 
Average Percent of 
Portfolio Invested in 
Lowest-Fee Fund  
21.1% 13.9%  2.17  115.94  .032 
Average Percent of 
Portfolio Invested in 
Highest-Fee Fund 
7.55% 10.42%  1.38  126.08  .170 
  
D.  Diversification 
Finally, we considered the extent to which the fee instruction 
affected the propensity of the subjects to engage in a naïve 
diversification strategy. Table 10 compares the concentration of funds by 
condition, using a concentration measure based on each fund’s Euclidean 
distance from the perfectly even distribution.
144 This concentration 
measure assesses the degree to which a subject’s portfolio differed from 
the naïve 1/n investment strategy.
145   
                                                 
144 See Beshears, et al., supra note __.  Concentration is measured by the square root of 
the sum of the squared differences between the actual allocations and the even 
distribution (.10, .10, .10,.10, .10, .10,.10, .10, .10, .10). The most diversified portfolio 
would be zero, and the most concentrated portfolio (100% in one fund, 0 in 9 funds) is 
.949. 
145 We also measured diversification using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, typically 
employed to measure the concentration of market power in an industry, which simply  
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The results here illustrate most dramatically the limitations of our 
Fees instruction.  For both subject pools, subjects in the Fees group had 
more concentrated portfolios than those in the control group – that is, 
their portfolios looked less like the paradigmatic naïvely diversified 
allocation. However, even though both groups’ allocations were more 
concentrated, subjects did not actually invest in significantly fewer total 
funds. MTurk subjects invested a positive amount in a median of 6 total 
funds, and the median for WBL subjects was even higher, at 8 total 
funds. In both cases, the mean number of funds invested is slightly lower 
for the Fees group than for the control group, but not significantly so. In 
addition, although subjects responded to the instruction by reducing their 
allocations to high fee funds, they did not shift out of high fee funds 
entirely. 
Table 10.  Concentration of investments, by condition, for both 
subject pools 
  Fee 
Group 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean 
T Df  p 
Concentration: 
WBL 
.333 .287 1.98  128.47  .050 
Concentration: 
Amazon Turk 
.376 .315 1.75  122.78  .082 
 
E.  Robustness: Subjects with Investment Experience 
In our last analysis, we consider how the fee instruction affected 
a particular sub-group of subjects who we predict would be less in need 
of investor education. Because the Amazon Turk subjects were not 
primarily drawn from a student population, we looked at some 
experimental effects on the sub-group of the sample who had investment 
experience. Of the 197 MTurk subjects, 54.8% reported that they had a 
retirement account for which they made investment decisions. Noting at 
the outset that tests of the experimental manipulation on this sub-group 
are less powerful because the sample size is smaller, we found that the 
fee instruction affected decision-making even when investors were not 
entirely new to investing.  
                                                                                                                       
sums the squared percentage allocated to each fund. This measure also yielded 
statistically significant differences in concentration by condition, at p=.028 for the 
WBL subject pool and p=.067 for the Turk pool.   
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Looking only at experienced investors, the fee instruction 
increased subjects’ clicks on fee links from 3.9 to 8.7 clicks (t=3.14, 
df=58.12, p=.003). Those who saw the fee instruction paid a significantly 
lower total fee (.63% vs. .75%) than those in the control group (t=2.13, 
df=71.00, p=.037). The instruction made subjects invest slightly, though 
not significantly, more in the lowest-fee fund (p=.237) and slightly less 
in the highest-fee fund (mean difference=3.8%, t=1.85, df=64.16, 
p=.069). Experienced subjects in the Fee group were also much more 
likely to report that the most important consideration was operating 
expenses compared with experienced subjects in the control group 
(percent difference=30.8, t=3.46, df=48.84, p=.001). 
V.  IMPLICATIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
This study constitutes preliminary research.  Consequently, our 
ability to generalize from our results is limited. As noted above, our 
study contained a number of simplifications and design choices that we 
will investigate further through additional research.   
In particular, we deliberately designed our study, in contrast to 
other experimental studies (and the real world of investing), to make fee 
information simple, accessible and comparable. Our simplification was 
designed to enable us to differentiate between a cognitive failure -- the 
inability to understand fee information -- and a motivational failure – 
indifference to fees even when they are clear and available. Our results 
suggest that subjects who are not motivated to seek and use fee 
information will fail to do so, even when cognitive barriers are minimal. 
The simplification of fee information, in the absence of a Fees 
instruction, appeared to be of limited value. Without the fee instruction, 
our subjects tended to diversify among the investment options provided, 
to pay average fees, and to obtain average performance from their 
investments. This suggests that the SEC’s emphasis on improving 
disclosure, at least in the absence of improved investor education, may 
be misplaced. 
Our interpretation of these results is that investor ignorance of the 
economic significance of mutual fund fees limits their reliance on fee 
information in choosing among investment alternatives. Mutual fund 
fees are presented in fractions of a percent, and investors may assume  
 
44 
 
that the real cost of such fees is negligible.
146 Our study predicts that, if 
investors are instructed about the importance of fees, they will be more 
attentive to fees in choosing among funds. 
In a small follow-up study we explored the extent to which 
inattention to fees might be the result of limited investor financial 
literacy. In a 2-minute questionnaire, subjects were asked to estimate the 
difference between two 30-year investments of $10,000 with an average 
(before fees) rate of return of 8%, one with a 1% fee and the other with a 
2% fee.
147 The correct answer is approximately $20,000. The median 
response was $3,000, and almost 40% of subjects underestimated the 
effect of the fee by an order of magnitude. This is a very rough way to 
picture how individuals approach the complex compound interest 
problem. Nonetheless, it supports a possible explanation for why 
investors do not change their behavior in response to simplified fee 
information: they do not think that fees, which seem very small, will 
have big effects on funds’ returns. 
Limited investor understanding of the magnitude of the fee 
impact may also explain why our subjects’ response to the Fees 
instruction was limited.  Although the instruction stated that fees were 
important, it neither told investors why nor quantified the effect of a 
small fee differential.  Even if investors are told that fees matter, our 
small study suggests that they may under-estimate the importance of 
small fee differences.  A more explicit instruction, such as one indicating 
that the choice between funds with small differences in fees can, over the 
life of a retirement account by as much as 35% may have a greater effect 
on investor behavior.  We intend, through future research, to experiment 
                                                 
146 Such an assumption is, of course, mistaken. An investor who invests $10,000 in a 
retirement account that earns an 8% return (before fees) for thirty years and that charges 
a .5% fee will have more than $85,000 in retirement savings. If the fees are 2% instead, 
that same account will be worth less than $55,000. 
147 The study was a short survey on Amazon Turk. 185 subjects were paid $.75 and half 
received a bonus of a $.25 bonus for above-average accuracy. Before seeing the main 
question, they were told, “[w]hen you buy shares of a mutual fund, as many people do 
when they choose a retirement portfolio, a percentage of the investment goes toward the 
mutual fund’s annual operating expenses – in other words, mutual funds charge 
investors a yearly fee which is automatically deducted from investor accounts. In this 
task, you are being asked to estimate the total cost of a mutual fund’s fees over a long 
time period.” They were instructed to answer the question quickly, without using a 
calculator.   
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with varying the nature of the fee instruction in order to determine 
whether we can thereby improve its effectiveness.
148 
Our findings about the extent of diversification seem to confirm a 
high degree of naïve diversification, consistent with the literature. We 
are particularly troubled by the frequency with which investors allocate 
money to both members of a pair-wise set of funds in which one 
alternative is objectively inferior to the other. Our findings suggest that 
an employer’s burden in designing an appropriate 401(k) plan may be 
particularly difficult because the inclusion of even a few poor or more 
costly investment choices in a plan can harm investors who are unable to 
identify and eliminate such funds. They also suggest that investors do not 
truly understand the objective of diversification. Here, as with fees, we 
intend to explore the extent to which information and instructions can 
improve the quality of investor decisions.  
Our results with respect to both fees and diversification raise 
broader questions about the extent to which retail investors truly 
understand the investment process. Efficient retirement investing 
demands that investors understand basic principles of costs and 
diversification, but also the effect of compounding, the value of asset 
allocation and the consequences of these choices for investing over a 
thirty-year (or more) time horizon. Our next study will focus to a larger 
degree on investor cognition in an effort to distinguish between 
investors’ failure to set appropriate objectives from their inability to meet 
their objectives. 
Our study raises particular concern that investors (and employers 
as well) do not understand what they are supposed to do in investing for 
retirement.  Given our subjects’ expressed levels of discomfort with the 
investment process, we predict that, rather than attempting to understand 
these concepts, investors search for short-cuts, heuristics and 
opportunities to delegate. Indeed, studies show that an increasing number 
of retirement investors attempt to delegate their investment decisions by 
choosing actively managed mutual funds, target-date funds or 
professionally managed accounts.
149 Delegating responsibility for 
                                                 
148 Compare Mercer et al., supra note __ (conducting an experiment to vary the strength 
of performance disclaimer and finding that stronger disclaimers were more effective). 
149 See More 401(k) Participants Turning to Professionals for 
Help, Financial Planning, (June 27, 2012), http://www.financial-
planning.com/news/more-401k-participants-turning-to-professional-for-help-vanguard-
says-2679595-1.html (stating that more than one third of Vanguard’s 401(k) plan  
 
46 
 
investment decisions makes investors vulnerable to the choices of 
professionals, choices that may be opaque, shielded from market 
discipline or tainted by conflicts of interest.  
The popularity of target-date funds in 401(k) plans is one 
example. Target-date funds provide investors with a gradual shift from 
equity to fixed income as the investor nears retirement age, thereby 
relieving investors of the burden of determining how to allocate their 
assets appropriately.
150 When the financial crisis hit, investors learned 
that different target-date funds had widely varied approaches to asset 
allocation and were far riskier than investors had believed.
151  Similarly, 
target-date funds vary substantially in fees and complexity – one article 
reports that that fees range from less than .2% to more than 1%.
152  
Existing regulatory provisions encourage employees to invest in target-
date funds, but our analysis suggests that, because these funds may 
purport to relieve investors of the need to evaluate costs and risks, 
employer obligations to screen such choices more carefully be greater. 
Our study has important implications for plan design.  Courts and 
commentators, such as the Wal-Mart court suggest that retirement plan 
design should focus on offering employees a broad array choices that 
include several low cost options.  If, however, if investors do not avoid 
inferior investment options, the inclusion of such options may be 
problematic.  In addition, the menu of options offered may influence 
investors’ allocations, cause investors to select too many funds, or 
paralyze investors altogether. 
Finally, the limited attention our subjects paid to fund fees casts 
doubt on the claim, as reflected in Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Jones, 
that market competition renders judicial oversight of fees unnecessary.  
                                                                                                                       
participants turned their accounts over to professional money managers); Elizabeth 
O’Brien,  10 Things 401(k) Plans Won’t Tell You, MARKETWATCH (reporting that 
employees invest almost three times as much money in actively managed equity funds 
as index funds, despite the higher cost of actively managed funds). 
150 Gwendolyn A. Williamson, Retirement Product Disclosure Rules and 
the Impact on Mutual Fund Distribution, 19 INVESTMENT LAWYER (Oct. 2012). 
151 Id. These concerns led the SEC to develop a rule-making proposal for target-date 
funds.  See P ROPOSED  RULE,  INVESTMENT  COMPANY  ADVERTISING:  TARGET  DATE 
RETIREMENT FUND NAMES AND MARKETING, SEC Release Nos. 33-9126; 34-62300; 
IC-29301; File No. S7-12-10 (June 16, 2010); (75 FR 35920 (June 23, 2010)), 
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/33-9126.pdf. 
152Pat Regnier, Three Things to Know About Target-Date Funds, CNNMONEY (July 31, 
2012).  
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The relative insensitivity of investors to economically important fee 
differences suggests a market failure and one that cannot readily be 
addressed by the SEC’s current focus on expanded disclosure.  
CONCLUSION 
Many studies have identified biases or mistakes in consumers’ 
real-world investment decisions. Regulatory changes that have increased 
individual consumer responsibility for retirement savings and investment 
choices magnify the consequences of these mistakes. The extent to 
which disclosures, investor education, or other strategies can address 
these mistakes is of critical policy concern.  
We constructed an experiment designed to inform the process of 
regulatory design by developing a greater understanding of investor 
decision-making behavior.  The study has important implications for 
future regulatory policy. First, our results contribute evidence that 
investor choice, without more, does little to protect investors or to 
produce efficient investment decisions. Second, our study casts doubt on 
the claim that poor investor decisions are the result of lengthy or 
confusing disclosure documents and suggests that simplified disclosure, 
without more, is unlikely to affect investor behavior significantly. Third, 
they suggest a research agenda for improving investor literacy. 
The experimental manipulation in this study, although modest, 
affected both investor behavior and beliefs significantly. Our results 
suggest that offering investor education, even in the form of a simple 
instruction, can make a big difference.       
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